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Backdoor Engineering
By Markus G. Kuhn
Imagine you are a cyber spy. Your
day job is to tap cryptographically
protected communications systems.
But how? Straightforward cryptanal-
ysis has long become impractical: the
task of breaking modern algorithms
far exceeds all computational power
available to humanity. That leaves
sabotage.
You can target many Achilles
heels of a crypto system: random-
bit generators, side channels, binary
builds, certification authorities, weak
default configurations. You infiltrate
the teams that design, implement and
standardize commercial security sys-
tems and plant there hidden weak-
nesses, known as backdoors, that later
allow you to bypass the cryptography.
Take random-bit generation. Se-
curity protocols distinguish intended
peers from intruders only through
their knowledge of secret bit se-
quences. Servers have to chose many
key values at random to protect each
communication session, and an adver-
sary who can successfully guess these
can impersonate legitimate users.
One trick to backdoor a random
generator can be understood with ba-
sic high-school algebra. A determin-
istic random-bit generator (DRBG) is
initialized (seeded) with a start state
s0, and then iterated with some gen-
erator function: si+1 := G(si)
s0 s1 s2
G(s0) G(s1) · · ·
In simple DRBGs (say for simula-
tions), the si may serve as both the
state of the generator as well as its
output. So anyone who saw an out-
put si and knows G can easily pre-
dict all future outputs. Crypto-grade
DRBGs make four improvements: (a)
hardware noise sources (slow) seed s0,
(b) the state si has hundreds or thou-
sands of bits, (c) a second function H
derives output values ri := H(si)
s0 s1 s2
r0 r1 r2
H(s0) H(s1) H(s2)
G(s0) G(s1) · · ·
and (d) both G and H are one-way
functions. These can be computed ef-
ficiently, but their inverses not. After
H, an adversary who can see some
of the outputs ri cannot infer any-
thing about the internal states si or
other outputs rj . We know many ex-
cellent choices for G and H: one-way
functions carefully engineered to be
fast and to have no other known ex-
ploitable properties. Most are con-
structed from secure hash functions
or block ciphers.
As a saboteur, you do not want
these used. Instead, you lure your
victims towards a far more danger-
ous option: the class of algebraic one-
way functions that enabled public-
key crypto. These are orders of mag-
nitude slower and require much big-
ger values for equal security. Modular
exponentiation is a simple example.
If you follow a few rules for choos-
ing a big integer g and a big prime
number p, then G(x) := gx mod p
is such a one-way function. While
gx alone is monotonic, and thus easy
to invert, the mod p operation (take
the remainder after division by p)
ensures that the result remains uni-
formly spread over a fixed interval
and appears to behave highly ran-
domly. The inverse discrete loga-
rithm problem, of calculating x when
given (gx mod p, p, g), becomes com-
putationally infeasible. (In the fol-
lowing, we drop mention of the mod
p operation, and just apply it auto-
matically after each arithmetic oper-
ation.) The exponentiation operator
gx has an important additional prop-
erty, not affected by the mod oper-
ation: (gx)y = (gy)x. While this
commutativity is completely useless
to honest designers of DRBGs, it can
be invaluable to saboteurs.
Convince your victims that
G(si) := g
si and H(si) := h
si are
excellent choices for generating ran-
dom numbers of the highest security:
s0 s1 s2
r0 r1 r2
hs0 hs1 hs2
gs0 gs1 · · ·
You can claim “provable security
based on number-theoretical assump-
tions”, but this is, of course, just a
smoke screen. The sole advantage
of this construction is that it allows
a backdoor. If you can choose g as
g := he, then knowing your secret
integer e immediately allows you to
convert any output value ri into the
next internal state of the DRBG as
(ri)
e = (hsi)e = (he)si = gsi = si+1:
s0 s1 s2
r0 r1 r2
hs0 hs1
hs2
gs0 gs1
re0 r
e
1
· · ·
So if you contact a server and re-
ceive one ri, you can now immediately
predict all future rj used to protect
the communication with others, and
decrypt or impersonate their mes-
sages. Job done. And nobody else
can do this, because finding e from
h and g is computationally infeasi-
ble (the aforementioned discrete log-
arithm problem). Unless, of course,
they steal your backdoor by generat-
ing their own e′ and replacing your g
with their g′ := he
′
.
The following article by Check-
oway et al. reports on the amazing
independent reconstruction of exactly
such a backdoor, discovered in the
firmware of a VPN router commonly
used to secure access to corporate in-
tranets. In 2004, the NSA planted the
above DRBG in NIST standard SP
800-90, including a g and h of their
choice. The details differ only slightly
(elliptic curve operations rather than
modular exponentiation, which uses
slightly different notation; the top 16
bits of ri discarded, can be guessed
via trial and error). The basic idea is
identical.
But planting a backdoor in a stan-
dard is not enough. You now also
have to ensure industry implements
it correctly, such that an ri reaches
you intact. And that nobody else re-
places your g. And that is where this
story begins.
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